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Goodness and Desire
* 
 
Matthew Boyle and Douglas Lavin 
Harvard University 
 
It is always the object of desire which produces movement, 
but this is either the good or the apparent good.  
 Aristotle,  De Anima, III.10 (433a28-29) 
 
1. Introduction 
Aristotle famously held that all desiring is directed toward some actual or apparent good, and 
a long train of celebrated philosophers have agreed with him, from Aquinas and Kant to 
Anscombe and Davidson.  Philosophers writing in this tradition have tended to find 
Aristotle’s proposition not merely correct but obvious, so obvious that the Scholastics 
codified it in a dictum: quidquid appetitur, appetitur sub specie boni, “whatever is desired is 
desired under the guise of the good.”  The last few decades, however, have seen a vigorous 
attack on this guise of the good thesis.  The Aristotelian doctrine has been dismissed as not 
merely wrong but naïve, reflecting a picture of the human heart that is either hopelessly 
innocent or deliberately one-sided.
1  What accounts for this transformation?  How could what 
seemed plain to so many come to seem so patently false? 
Contemporary critics of the guise of the good thesis often support their rejection of it 
by citing putative counterexamples: cases in which people fail to desire what they regard as 
good (accidie), desire most what they do not think best (akrasia), or even desire what they do 
not regard as good at all, as when one person feels a purely malicious or spiteful urge to lash 
out at another.  Milton’s Satan, when he resolves “Evil be thou my good,” expresses a 
                                                 
* For comments and suggestions, we are very grateful to Rachel Cohen, Wolfram Gobsch, Matthias Haase, Dick 
Moran, Jessica Moss, Arthur Ripstein, Sebastian Rödl, Tamar Schapiro, Kieran Setiya, Martin Stone, Gisela 
Striker, Sergio Tenenbaum, and to audiences at the universities of Basel, Colgate, Leipzig, and Toronto.  
1 A representative expression of this new standpoint occurs near the beginning of Michael Stocker’s “Desiring 
the Bad” (1979).  According to Stocker, 
…it is hardly unfair, if unfair at all, to suggest that the philosophical view is overwhelmingly 
that the good or only the good attracts.  At least, this is how I am forced to interpret so many 
philosophers.  This affords me no pleasure, since that view… is clearly and simply false.  (p. 
740) 
For similar assessments, see J. David Velleman, “The Guise of the Good” (2000c), esp. pp. 118-119 and Kieran 
Setiya, “Explaining Action” (2003), esp. p. 353. “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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perversity that is extreme in its degree, but the kind of impulse he feels is hardly unknown to 
us: we are all familiar with the chasms that can open between what we want and what we take 
to be good or valuable.  Gary Watson provides a vivid sketch of this parting of ways: 
The cases in which one in no way values what one desires are perhaps rare, but 
surely they exist.  Consider the case of a woman who has a sudden urge to 
drown her bawling child in the bath; or the case of a squash player who, while 
suffering an ignominious defeat, desires to smash his opponent in the face with 
the racquet.  It is just false that the mother values her child’s being drowned or 
that the player values the injury and suffering of his opponent.  But they desire 
these things none the less.  They desire them in spite of themselves.
2 
Pointing to such cases, critics of the guise of the good thesis ask: How can it be true that 
desire is directed toward the good if sometimes it palpably isn’t?   
  It seems doubtful, however, that attention to such cases by itself accounts for the 
contemporary turn against the guise of the good thesis.  For whatever philosophers writing in 
the Aristotelian tradition meant by saying that we desire under the guise of the good, they 
were hardly unaware that people can want what they take to be wicked or worthless: they 
themselves emphasized such cases.  What seemed to them obvious was not that perverse 
desires are impossible, but that they must be understood in a certain way: as involving a kind 
of mutiny of some of our motivational faculties, a mutiny that results in an object’s being put 
forward as desirable by one faculty even as others deny its desirability.  Contemporary critics 
of the guise of the good thesis, by contrast, do not feel pressure to interpret cases of perverse 
desire in this way: they do not see why desiring something need involve any tendency, 
however partial, to regard it as desirable.  To understand the basis of the recent turn against 
the guise of the good thesis, we must understand the reasons for this change. 
  Why might it seem that desiring something must involve some tendency to see that 
thing as desirable?  The intuitive reason seems to be this: a person who wants something can 
in general be asked why he wants it, and then he is expected to answer, not by giving some 
sort of psycho-history of his own desire, but rather by offering another sort of account – one 
that describes what we call his “reasons” for wanting the thing in question, the considerations 
he takes to “speak in favor” of pursuing that object.
3  The guise of the good thesis is, in effect, 
                                                 
2 Gary Watson, “Free Agency” (1982), p. 101. 
3 For a prima facie justification of the guise of the good thesis by appeal to these sorts of observations, see for 
instance Joseph Raz, “The Guise of the Good” (this volume).   “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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a claim about what sort of thing a reason is: namely, that it is a consideration that bears on 
what is good about what is wanted.  Contemporary opposition to the thesis is bound up with a 
rejection of this claim.  Thus many contemporary philosophers of action insist on a deep 
distinction between justifying reasons, which speak to the goodness of an object or course of 
action, and explanatory reasons, which speak to the question why, in fact, an agent was 
motivated to do a certain thing.   
If an agent can answer the question why he wants to do something, then, on this view, he will 
be giving an explanatory reason, and while this may bear on what is good about the thing he 
wants, there is no obvious reason why it must.   
  This suggests that the real source of the turn against the guise of the good thesis lies in 
a shift in the understanding of reasons-explanation.  The Aristotelian tradition sees such 
explanation as a particularly sophisticated form of teleological explanation, one that 
represents us as drawn, not simply toward ends that are in fact good, but toward goods that act 
on us in virtue of our representing them as such.  Contemporary philosophers, by contrast, are 
nearly unanimous in their unwillingness to countenance an unreduced appeal to teleology.  
The fundamental explanation of action, they assume, must advert to some precedent 
psychological state of the subject, a state which is the efficient cause of certain bodily 
movements, and whose causal role in producing these movements can be specified without 
appeal to teleological notions.
4  It may be that our desires tend to move us toward things that 
are good for us; indeed, this tendency may figure in an evolutionary explanation of why 
Homo sapiens typically desire what they do.  But even if it is a fact that our desires tend to 
                                                 
4 This is not to say that contemporary authors are unwilling to speak of a person acting in order to achieve a 
certain goal or because he had a certain aim.  Most authors admit that these are genuine explanations, and that 
they may be called “teleological” inasmuch as they relate the agent’s action to an end.  What they do not admit is 
that the goodness, or represented goodness, of the end plays an essential role in the explanation: on their view, to 
say that an action is explained by a certain end is really to say that it is explained by a certain precedent 
psychological state of the agent (his wanting to achieve that end) whose efficacy does not depend on its tendency 
to move the agent toward things that are good for him.  This view of action-explanation accords well with the 
widespread view that, in general, superficially teleological forms of explanation should in principle be reducible 
to explanations of other kinds.  As John Hawthorne and Daniel Nolan observe in a recent article on teleological 
explanation: 
[W]hen contemporary philosophers and biologists tell stories about… natural teleology they 
tend to proceed as if there is a different underlying explanation: superficial teleology gives way 
to an underlying reality that is not fundamentally teleological at all.  This is so even in the case 
of mental activity.  Teleology gives way to mental representations that play efficient causal 
roles (which in turn may enjoy deeper explanations that proceed via categories that are not 
mentalistic at all).  (“What Would Teleological Causation Be?” [2006], p. 266) “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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move us toward what is beneficial to us, it is hard to see, from this standpoint, why they must 
do so, and still harder to see why they must represent their objects as good.  For why 
shouldn’t desires for things that the subject does not evaluate as good be capable of playing 
the same sort of causal role in producing behavior as desires which rest on such an 
evaluation?  The characteristic explanatory role of desire seems to be one topic; the relation, if 
any, of desire to a sense of justification, another.  It may be true that an agent can normally 
give his reason for acting in the sense of: the desire which explains his acting; but to infer that 
an agent must normally take himself to have a reason for acting in the sense of: a justification 
for doing what he does – this, it seems, is to equivocate between two different senses of 
“reason for acting.”  As Kieran Setiya remarks in an important recent discussion:  
[W]e need a causal-psychological account of taking-as-one’s-reason, not an 
account that appeals to what is seen as good.  When an agent acts on a reason, 
he takes it as a reason, but that means he takes it as his reason, not that he takes 
it to be a good reason on which to act.
5 
  Our aim in this essay is to challenge the assumptions that make such a distinction 
seem necessary, and thus make the Aristotelian doctrine about the relation between goodness 
and desire seem puzzling.  We shall argue that the primary source of contemporary opposition 
to the guise of the good thesis lies in a certain set of views about action and its explanation, 
views which form the core of the standard “causal theory of action.”  But, we shall suggest, 
these views imply substantive and questionable commitments about the shape an account of 
intentional action must take; and once these commitments are questioned, the guise of the 
good thesis reemerges, not as an isolated and dubious claim about what motivates people to 
act, but as a proposition belonging to an attractive and coherent account of what action is.   
  On the Aristotelian view, what underlies the fact that rational agents must desire under 
the guise of the good is a general point about the explanation of any self-movement or self-
change, a point that applies, in different forms, to the explanation of behavior in nonrational 
animals, and even to the explanation of the nutrition, growth and reproduction of nonsentient 
                                                 
5 “Explaining Action” (2003), p. 380.  Compare also J. David Velleman’s contention, in an influential paper on 
the guise of the good thesis, that  
even if desiring something consists in regarding the thing as good in a sense synonymous with 
“to be brought about,” it isn’t an attempt at getting right whether the thing really is to be 
brought about, and so it doesn’t amount to a judgment on the thing’s goodness.  (“The Guise of 
the Good” [2000c], p. 117)  “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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living things.  What these various kinds of explanation have in common is that they all have a 
teleological structure; and it is characteristic of the Aristotelian tradition to claim that, quite 
generally, this sort of structure applies only to a subject that is the bearer of a certain sort of 
form, a form that constitutes a standard of goodness for the subject in question, but that is 
equally implicated in any explanation of what the subject itself does.  The special feature of 
the application of this explanatory structure to rational creatures is that such creatures belong 
to a kind in which this connection between action and goodness becomes self-conscious: they 
are creatures whose action is expressive of and explained by a self-conception which 
implicitly involves a conception of their own form.  This, it will emerge, is why rational self-
movers must desire under the guise of the good.   
  Our project in what follows will be to fill out this Aristotelian view of action, and, we 
hope, to present it in such a way that it appears to be, not merely a set of strange and 
antiquated ideas about how the world works, but rather a serious and defensible attempt to 
understand what action is.  Our main aim in doing this is simply to bring out what is at stake 
in the acceptance or rejection of the guise of the good thesis.  Many discussions of the thesis 
treat it as meriting attention simply because it has a certain historical authority and also, 
perhaps, a certain intuitive appeal.  If we are right, its real interest lies in its connection with 
an approach to action that stands opposed in fundamental ways to the approach that dominates 
contemporary action theory.  We can hardly hope to make a conclusive case for this 
alternative approach here, but we hope at least to make clear what it is and why it might have 
a powerful appeal.  We will make this case by first presenting a challenge to the causal-
psychologistic approach typically presupposed by critics of the guise of the good thesis (§3), 
and then sketching the outlines of an alternative, one that takes its departure from a general 
thought about the connection between self-movement and the form or nature of a thing (§4), 
and that represents the guise of the good thesis as the upshot of this general thought when it is 
applied to rational creatures (§5).  To clear the way for this enterprise, however, it will help 
first to make a few points about how to understand the thesis and how to assess it (§2).   
 
2.  The meaning of the thesis and how to assess it 
Before deciding whether the guise of the good thesis is true, we must first consider what it 
means, and already here we face difficulties.  Aristotle himself formulates the thesis in “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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various ways: sometimes as a claim about the object of desire, sometimes as a claim about the 
aim of every “action or pursuit.”
6  On which formula should we focus?  Moreover, what 
should count as the “object” of a desire, or the “aim” of an action?  If I want to eat an apple, 
for instance, is the object of my desire an apple, or eating an apple, or perhaps my eating an 
apple?  Does the guise of the good thesis apply to all of these sorts of “objects,” or only to 
certain ones?  Finally, what does it mean to say that the object of desire or the aim of action 
must present itself to the agent “under the guise of the good”?  Does it mean that the agent 
must believe that the object is good, or that there is something good about it, or that it would 
be good if …?  Or is the relevant attitude something altogether other than belief?   
  We will say something about each of these questions in due course.  For the moment, 
our purpose is simply to point them out, in order to forestall a too-hasty assessment of the 
thesis.  Many discussions of the thesis, both by its defenders and by its critics, proceed by 
marshalling intuitions about cases.  But if the meaning of the thesis itself is not obvious, 
neither can we treat it as obvious at the outset what sorts of cases would speak for or against 
it.  Indeed, the idea that the thesis admits of a direct assessment by reference to examples rests 
on a dubious assumption about the kind of claim that is at issue.   
  To see this, it will help to consider a case in point.  As we mentioned earlier, much of 
the debate surrounding the guise of the good thesis focuses on certain sorts of apparent 
counterexamples: for instance, cases in which an agent does something, or desires to do it, out 
of sheer spite or malice.  Discussing such cases, Michael Stocker observes that 
When we feel furious, hurt, envious, jealous, threatened, frustrated, abandoned, 
endangered, rejected, and so on, what we often seek is precisely the harm or 
destruction of someone, and not always the “offending party”: “If I can’t have 
her, no one will.” “So, you are leaving me after all I have done for you. Well 
then, take that.” “You stole her from me, now it’s my turn to get even.” “The 
whole day has gone so badly, I might as well complete it by ruining the little I 
did accomplish.” … Given such moods and circumstances, harming another 
can be the proper and direct object of attraction. (1979, p. 748)  
Each of these lines of imagined dialogue vividly evokes a sort of situation in which a person 
wants to cause harm, and Stocker persuasively argues that the harm caused is not necessarily 
regarded as itself something good, or as tending to produce some further consequence that is 
                                                 
6 For the former sort of formulation, see the passage from De Anima quoted in the epigraph above.  For the latter 
formulation, see Nicomachean Ethics, I.1.   “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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good.  But does this disprove the claim that the object of desire is always wanted under the 
guise of the good?  The answer depends crucially on what should count as the object of 
desire.  Stocker assumes that “the object of desire,” in the sense relevant to the guise of the 
good thesis, must be some end achieved by acting – someone’s being harmed, or some further 
consequence resulting from someone’s being harmed – rather than the desired action itself – 
my “getting even,” in one way or another, for some perceived wrong done to me.  If the latter 
is the object of desire, then the idea that the relevant desires represent their objects as good is 
no less plausible than the claim that to regard something as an act of “evening the score” is to 
regard it as good in at least one respect.
7   
  Our purpose for the moment is not to give a detailed defense of this approach to 
Stocker’s cases, but simply to bring out how supposed counterexamples to the guise of the 
good thesis can raise questions of interpretation whose resolution is no simpler than, and 
indeed closely intertwined with, the assessment of the thesis itself.  As the literature on such 
cases amply illustrates, there is typically room for controversy about how to describe any 
given class of examples – about what to call the object of an agent’s desire, how to 
characterize his attraction to it, and consequently, whether to regard the cases as genuine 
counterexamples.  The fact that such controversies break out is not just a reflection of 
philosophers’ limitless appetite for dispute; it reflects the fact that the concepts employed in 
describing the examples are the very concepts whose proper employment the guise of the 
good thesis seeks to characterize.  To suppose that the thesis admits of direct refutation by 
counterexample must presumably involve supposing that it asserts a necessary connection 
between two concepts – desiring and regarding-as-good – each of whose principles of 
application are clear enough.  For if this were not assumed, how could we be confident in any 
                                                 
7 Admittedly, in some of Stocker’s examples, the party with whom the agent seeks to “get even” is not a party 
who could reasonably be regarded as having given offense.  Indeed, in some cases, it is not a person at all, but a 
thing (the world, the day) on which the agent acts out a fantasy of revenge.  These sorts of knowingly 
unreasonable or fantastical actions raise interesting problems for action theory, but they do not interfere with the 
point that, inasmuch as the action is wanted as a way (however unreasonable or fanciful) of getting even, it is 
wanted under an aspect of the good.  Such desires, even the irrational ones, seem to be primitive manifestations 
of the desire for justice, and surely this sort of desire cannot be assumed not to be a desire for a certain form of 
good.   
  This is not to deny that there can be desires to harm which are not retributive, perhaps desires which are 
purely sadistic.  For these sorts of desires, however, it would be much less plausible to claim that the agent can 
simply want to do harm without wanting thereby to achieve some further end (getting pleasure, exercising power 
over others, etc.).  “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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given instance that the case we were considering was a clear-cut case of desiring which was 
clearly not a case of regarding-as-good?  But the guise of the good thesis is surely intended as 
a contribution to the clarification of each of these concepts: it aims to say something about 
what each is.  This does not imply that the thesis is correct in what it says, but it does suggest 
that the thesis must be assessed, not simply by appeal to cases, but by a systematic 
investigation of the importance of the concepts it links – of the role, if any, that each should 
play in a sound theory of action, and of the role of our power of reason in giving rise to 
action.  In the absence of such an investigation, what we will be tallying will be, at best, 
people’s intuitions about when to use the English words “desire” and “good,” and we will 
lack any principled basis for deciding which intuitions to trust. 
  We have been making these points with reference to authors who attempt to refute the 
guise of the good thesis by counterexample, but related criticisms apply to authors who 
attempt to defend the thesis by appealing to intuitions about what desiring is.  According to T. 
M. Scanlon, for instance, the idea of a mere disposition to act, where such a disposition lacks 
any evaluative component, “does not in fact fit very well with what we ordinarily mean by 
desire” since “desiring something involves having a tendency to see something good or 
desirable about it.”
8  To support this contention, Scanlon cites Warren Quinn’s well-known 
example of a man who finds himself with an unaccountable impulse to turn on every radio he 
sees: such dispositions may be conceivable, but, Scanlon observes, their presence seems not 
to rationalize the actions they induce, and we are not inclined to call them “desires,” or 
anyway not desires of the ordinary kind.  There must be – Scanlon concludes – some 
connection between desire and positive evaluation, or at least between desire and the tendency 
to think that there is a “justifying reason” to pursue the desired object. 
  But even if this conclusion is sound – as we believe it is – we should want to be able 
to support it, not just by provoking intuitions about what desire is, but by arguing that this is 
what desire must be.  After all, when we say that what we ordinarily mean by “desire” is a 
state that involves a tendency to regard the desired object as good, this is presumably not 
supposed to be merely a claim about what, as it happens, English-speakers are willing to call 
“desire”: it is supposed to characterize a real, integral phenomenon that we pick out using this 
                                                 
8 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (1998), p. 38. “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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term.  Moreover, the claim is presumably not that, as a matter of observed fact, there is a 
lawlike relation between two distinct kinds of psychological state, desiring and regarding-as-
good.  If the claim that desiring something involves having a tendency to see it as good were 
intended as this sort of empirical claim, then introspection and armchair reflection ought to 
give way to experiments and controlled studies.  But this is clearly not the sort of validation 
that most advocates of the guise of the good thesis take it to require.  The thesis is meant to 
state some sort of necessary truth about desire, something knowable on the basis of 
philosophical reflection rather than by observation and experiment.  If this is the character of 
the thesis, however, it seems that it should be supported by principled argument, not just by 
intuitions about cases.  
  Defenders of the guise of the good thesis should also aim to give a principled defense 
of the thesis for another reason.  For, however persuaded we are of the truth of the thesis, we 
will not really know, in the absence of a systematic investigation of the concepts it employs, 
what the thesis means.  Our intuitive notion of “regarding as good” collects together diverse 
modes of consideration: a thing can be regarded as good, seemingly, in being regarded as 
enjoyable, conducive to health or well-being, profitable to oneself, just or fair, required by 
duty, expressive of friendship or kindness, etc.  What is the principle that governs the 
inclusion of items on this list?  Lacking such a principle, we will not be in a position to make 
well-grounded judgments about whether any given class of desires should or should not count 
as involving a presentation of something as good.  But only an investigation of the systematic 
importance of the concepts of a good and of regarding something as good could supply us 
with such a principle.  
  Our project in what follows will be to mount a defense of the guise of the good thesis 
that brings out why the thesis matters by showing its place in a systematic account of the role 
of reason in action.  We shall be arguing, in effect, that to understand what it is to desire 
something, in the sense that is relevant to the explanation of intentional action, we must 
understand desiring as bound together with representing-as-good; and we will be defending 
this claim, not as an observation about how we use the word “desire” or as an empirical law of 
human psychology, but as a necessary truth about a concept of central theoretical importance.  
But this need not commit us to denying that people sometimes desire things which in their 
considered opinion have nothing good about them.  What we will deny is that it is possible to “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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say what sort of thing such perverse desires are perverse cases of without appealing to the idea 
of a capacity to represent as good.  This connection, we shall argue, is what anchors our 
understanding of the very concept of desire as it applies to rational creatures.  
 
3.  The causal theory of action and the object of desire 
To make a case for these connections, it is first necessary to contest a view about action and 
its explanation that is presupposed in much contemporary work in action theory.  We believe 
that it is fundamentally this view, rather than the appeal of particular counterexamples, that 
underlies most contemporary opposition to the guise of the good thesis.  In this section, we 
first sketch the view in question and then raise a difficulty for it.  The view derives much of 
its appeal from its apparent inevitability.  In pointing out a challenge it faces, we hope to show 
that it embodies a quite specific and questionable view about the shape a philosophical 
account of action must take.   
 
The problem of action and the causal theory.  To introduce the standard approach, and to 
bring out what can make it seem inevitable, it is useful to recall a common way of framing the 
question that a philosophical theory of action must answer.  As David Velleman observes, 
philosophers of action tend to introduce their topic by quoting “a bit of Wittgensteinian 
arithmetic”: “What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I 
raise my arm?”
9  Whatever Wittgenstein himself thought of the matter, contemporary 
philosophers who quote him typically assume that there should be a solution to this equation: 
a bodily intentional action should turn out to consist of a not-intrinsically-intentional bodily 
movement occurring in a context where certain further facts obtain.  This much seems 
inevitable: for if I intentionally raise my arm, then certainly my arm rises; but not every arm-
rising is an intentional arm-raising; so it seems that an intentional arm-raising must be an arm-
rising about which certain further facts are true.  And if this is right, then it seems that the task 
of the philosophy of action must be to specify which further facts are relevant.  
  Once this framework is in place, however, two points about the content of this 
specification will seem evident: first, that the facts in question must include facts about the 
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causes of the relevant bodily movement; and secondly, that these causes must involve mental 
states of or mental events occurring in the acting subject.  These assumptions constitute the 
framework within which the standard “causal theory of action” is elaborated.  A bodily 
intentional action, it is held, consists in (1) a bodily movement (2) caused in some “right way” 
by (3) mental states or events of certain specific sorts.  Different authors give different 
accounts of the sorts of mental states or events that are relevant, and there is debate over how 
to characterize the causal relation that must connect these with the resulting movement, but 
this general structure is common ground for most mainstream action theory.   
  Now, it is no surprise that the guise of the good thesis should look unmotivated to 
philosophers who conceive of action in this way.  The whole point of the causal theory is to 
make the notion of an intentional action intelligible by showing that it just amounts to a 
bodily movement of an unproblematic sort with certain specific causal antecedents.  If that is 
what an intentional action is, however, then the requirement that a representation of 
something as good should figure among these antecedents looks like a superfluous constraint 
on the mechanism.  No doubt the agent who acts intentionally must act with the intent of 
doing something, and so a representation of what he intends to do must presumably figure 
among the causes of the movements he makes; but there is no obvious reason why the 
guidance of movement by such a representation need involve the presence of a further 
representation of that doing, or something achieved by that doing, as good.  Any such 
constraint would seem to be a merely stipulative restriction on what we will count as “an 
intentional action,” not a requirement that flows from the sheer idea of movement guided by 
thought – at least not if the causal theorist is right about what the guidance of movement by 
thought amounts to.   
  There might seem to be the possibility of motivating the guise of the good thesis by 
arguing that an agent’s representation of what he intends to do must itself involve a 
representation of that action as good.  For it is tempting to suppose that a conative attitude like 
wanting or intending must represent a certain action as to be done, and then to infer that this 
must involve representing it as good to do (or as something that ought to be done).  But the 
causal theorist’s analysis of the situation will not support this reading of the phrase “to be 
done.”  Insofar as it is right to say that an agent who wants or intends to do something must 
represent a certain action as “to be done,” all this need mean, according to the causal theorist, “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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is that he represents it as what will transpire if his want or intention is fulfilled.  To say that 
such attitudes represent their objects as “to be done,” that is, is simply to mark something 
about the “direction of fit” of these attitudes: they represent a certain state of affairs, not as 
already obtaining, but as what shall come to obtain if the relevant attitude is satisfied.  But it 
is not obvious why this must entail any positive evaluation of the state of affairs in question: 
to suppose that it must is to confuse a “to be done” whose modal counterpart is “shall” with a 
“to be done” whose modal counterpart is “should.”
10  In the context of the causal theorist’s 
general understanding of what action is, then, the idea that conative attitudes must represent 
their objects as good will seem to be merely an additional restriction on the content of these 
attitudes, and one without evident motivation.     
  A defense of the guise of the good thesis, then, must begin by questioning the 
acceptability of the causal theorist’s story about what action is.  That is our aim in the 
remainder of this section: we shall argue that the causal theorist’s project of explaining what it 
is for a bodily movement to be an intentional action by appeal to its psychological causes 
faces a basic difficulty, since the basic sort of psychological cause that such a theory must 
posit, a desire to do something, can itself be explained only by appeal to the notion of 
intentional action.  It will emerge that the object of a desire to do is characterized by a 
distinctive kind of teleological organization, an organization which the causal theory cannot 
explain but must rather presuppose.  It will be through seeking to understand this organization 
that we will, in the end, arrive at a rationale for the guise of the good thesis. 
     
The immediate object of desire.  To bring out the difficulty facing the causal theory, it is 
necessary to consider more carefully what sorts of representations must figure among the 
causes of a bodily movement if that movement is to constitute an intentional action.  There is 
considerable controversy among causal theorists about exactly what sorts of mental items 
must play a role here: whether all that is needed is a desire to achieve some end and a belief 
about how to attain it, or whether there must be further causal factors in play: intentions, 
plans, self-referential beliefs about the causes of my movements, etc.  The difficulty we wish 
to raise, however, concerns a minimal commitment that any plausible version of the causal 
                                                 
10 This, in effect, is the diagnosis of the appeal of the guise of the good thesis suggested in Velleman 2000c – 
although stating it this way glosses over certain complexities in Velleman’s account. “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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theory must make, namely the commitment that the causal antecedents of my intentionally 
doing A must include a desire to do A.  It is hard to see how this could be denied: no doubt a 
person will often be moved to do A by further aims which are served by his doing A, but if he 
does A, and does so intentionally, then it seems that one thing that must move him is some 
motivating representation of doing A itself.  Otherwise, whatever movements he makes will 
not themselves by guided by thought in the way that the adverb “intentionally” demands: they 
may be movements that are caused by a representation of some further end, but they will not 
themselves be realizations of any aim of the agent.   
  We have called this motivating representation a desire (and we will follow the usual 
practice of speaking indifferently of what the agent “desires” and what he “wants”), but for 
our purposes here, little hangs on this designation.  All that is necessary is that the attitude in 
question should be a representation of what is to be done that plays a causal role in bringing 
the agent to do that very thing.  We refer to this representation as a “desire” in deference to a 
long tradition of using this term to name the condition which produces animate movement,
11 
but if some theorist wishes to insist that the attitude that moves us to act must be something 
else, we need not quarrel with this: the points we will make turn wholly on the object of the 
relevant attitude, the thing that we normally express with the infinitive phrase “to do A.”  The 
question we wish to press is whether the causal theorist is entitled to take attitudes toward this 
sort of object for granted in stating his theory; and if he is not, how his theory might do 
without them.   
  It is a striking fact about standard expositions of the causal theory that they tend to 
insist on rewriting desire-ascriptions which we would colloquially express by saying 
(1)   S wants to do A. 
by transforming what follows “wants” into a proposition, as in  
(2)  S wants that S does A.
12 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., the quotation from Aristotle that appears as our epigraph. 
12 The assumption is often not made explicit, though it comes out in the widespread use of a schematic “p” to 
represent the object of desire.  One author who gives explicit attention to the point is Alvin Goldman: 
My analysis of intentional action will make use of a certain species of wanting – viz., wanting 
to do certain acts.  Such wants are not essentially different from other wants, like wanting to 
possess certain objects.  Wanting an automobile consists (roughly) in feeling favorably toward 
the prospect of owning an automobile.  Wanting to take a walk consists (roughly) in feeling 
favorably toward the prospect of one’s taking a walk.  (1970, pp. 49-50) “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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This insistence on treating desire as taking a propositional object is of course not new to the 
causal theory: the idea that desire is a “propositional attitude” goes back at least to Russell.
13  
But this view of desire has a special attraction in the context of the causal theorist’s project: it 
helps to hold in place the idea that the satisfaction-conditions of desire do not raise any 
special problems over and above those raised by propositional attitudes in general.  What is it 
for a desire to be satisfied?  It is – causal theorists characteristically answer – simply for the 
condition it sets on the world to have come true, for a certain fact to have come to obtain.  If 
desire can be treated in this way, as having for its object what Michael Smith calls a “way the 
world could be,”
14 then the idea that desire represents its object as to be done, whereas belief 
represents its object as the case, is to be explained, not by appeal to a distinction between two 
fundamentally different sorts of representational content, but rather by reference to the 
different causal relations in which representational states with the same sort of content 
normally or properly stand.  And this is how causal theorists characteristically explain the 
distinction.  Smith provides a helpfully explicit statement of this idea: 
the difference between beliefs and desires in terms of direction of fit comes 
down to a difference between the counterfactual dependence of a belief and a 
desire that p on a perception that not p: roughly, a belief that p is a state that 
tends to go out of existence in the presence of a perception that not p, whereas 
a desire that p is a state that tends to endure, disposing the subject to bring it 
about that p.
15 
  Other causal theorists would explain the “direction of fit” of desire somewhat 
differently, but the general approach pursued here seems to be crucial to the theory: for it is 
crucial to the theory that what it is for an agent to perform an intentional action should be 
explicable in terms of concepts independent of the concept of intentional action itself.  In 
particular, a causal theorist must suppose, on pain of circularity, that the concept of desire (or 
whatever representational state is supposed to guide action) need not itself be explained by 
                                                                                                                                                       
Notice how, in the last sentence of this remark, wanting to take a walk becomes wanting one’s taking a walk, 
which includes a subject term.  Since Goldman elsewhere uses “p” as his schema for the object of desire, he 
presumably intends that the complex noun phrase “one’s taking a walk” be transformable, in turn, into a 
proposition. 
13 See Bertrand Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth: “We pass next to the analysis of ‘propositional 
attitudes’, i.e., believing, desiring, doubting, etc., that so-and-so is the case” (1992, p. 21). 
14 Cp. Smith 2004, p. 165. 
15 Smith 1987, pp. 53-54.     “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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appeal to the concept of intentional action.  But then the object of desire must presumably be 
some outcome of an unproblematic kind, some recognizable state of affairs, and the fact that 
this outcome is achieved through intentional action must be explained in terms of a certain 
special sort of causal process having contributed to its coming about.  The assumption that “to 
be doneness” can be factored out of the object of desire, so to speak, and represented as part 
of way in which the attitude in question relates to its object, as part of its “direction of fit,” is 
thus crucial to the project.  For if this were not possible – if the kind of desire that gives rise to 
action were itself explicable only as a desire to act intentionally in a certain way – then the 
explanatory program of the causal theory would be compromised.  We would not be able to 
say what an intentional action is by appeal to the idea of a not-intrinsically-intentional bodily 
movement plus certain psychological causes operating in the right way, for the nature of the 
relevant psychological causes could not be explained without appeal to the notion of 
intentional action itself.  
  The idea that the object of desire is a certain state of affairs or proposition, the nature 
of whose obtaining can be treated as unproblematic, is thus a crucial prop to the causal theory.  
But what is the state of affairs toward which a desire of form (1) is directed?  On the face of 
it, such desires do not appear to take a propositional object: what follows the attitude verb is 
not a whole proposition but merely a certain sort of verbal predicate, and one that appears in a 
curiously infinitival form.  And although grammar may permit us to transform this object 
(awkwardly) into apparently propositional structures like the one in (2), problems begin to 
arise as soon as we ask when the condition that S does A counts as fulfilled.
16  For what 
condition on the world is set by the freestanding English sentence “S does A”?   When does 
this “state of affairs” obtain?  At any given time, a particular action will be either still 
underway, in which case we describe it in the progressive, “S is A-ing,” or already complete, 
in which case we describe it in the perfect, “S has A-ed.”
17  By using a verb in the infinitive to 
                                                 
16 In offering (2) as the proposition-directed counterpart of (1), we are following a widespread practice, but 
actually we feel unsure exactly what English grammar requires in the propositional complement here.  Perhaps it 
should be in the subjunctive, as in  
(2’)  S wants that S do A.   
But whatever form of the verb “to do” appears linking “S” and “A”, the question will remain: when does this 
supposed “state of affairs” obtain?   
17 Or in the simple past: “S A-ed.”  In either the perfect or the simple past, the verb phrase expresses perfective 
aspect: it represents the event in question as completed rather than underway.  For convenience, we will focus on “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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express what is wanted, desire-ascriptions of form (1) escape the problem of specifying which 
of these alternatives is in question; but we cannot construct a complete proposition setting a 
definite truth-condition without making a choice.
18  Should we, then, say that the 
propositional correlate of (3) is 
(3)  S wants that S will have A-ed ? 
This seems wrong inasmuch as it does not capture the desire to bring the relevant state of 
affairs about that is a part of (1).  Would my desire to go to the store count as fulfilled if I 
were blown there by a powerful wind or miraculously transported there by God?  The relevant 
want might lapse, of course, if my only reason for wanting to go to the store was that I wanted 
to have got there.  Still, it seems that my original want would not have been fulfilled unless 
my having arrived was my own doing.  But on the other hand, (1) certainly does not merely 
amount to  
(4)  S wants that S is A-ing 
for this would be compatible with S’s being indifferent about whether he actually completes 
the relevant action.   
  Nor, again, does it help to conjoin the two propositions to form 
(5)  S wants that S is A-ing and S will have A-ed 
for the want involved in (1) is not just to have been in two unrelated states, but to have arrived 
in the end state in virtue of having done all of the A-ing that was required to A.  But if we opt 
for something like 
(6)  S wants that S is A-ing as much as necessary in order that S will have A-ed 
then it seems that such understanding as we have of the contained proposition here depends 
on our knowing that (6) is supposed to be equivalent to (1).  For how much A-ing is 
necessary?  Not much if I am blown by a wind, but that is plainly not what is intended: the 
point is that I should do enough of it to satisfy the want to do A – where this means, 
presumably to effect the condition of my having done A through a process of intentional 
                                                                                                                                                       
the contrast between the progressive and the perfect, but it is really this contrast between forms that express 
imperfective aspect and forms that express perfective aspect that is crucial to our argument.  For further 
discussion of this distinction and its relation to English verb forms, see Comrie, Aspect (1976). 
18 It would not help to suggest that the agent wants that there be a certain event, as in 
(2’’)   S wants that (e)(e is a doing of A & e is by S). 
For when “is” there such an event?  Does this require the truth of “S is doing A”, or “S did A”, or what?  Each “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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action. 
  This is a long-winded way of bringing out something about the object of a desire to do 
A which is perhaps obvious, but which presentations of the causal theory tend to ignore: 
namely, that the object wanted is not some final state of affairs which might be brought about 
either intentionally or non-intentionally, but rather an object which “exists” only insofar as a 
certain intentional action has been carried through to its completion.  This makes difficulties 
for any attempt to explain such wanting in the causal theorist’s way, by appeal to the generic 
notion of representation of a “way the world could be” and the generic idea of a causal 
tendency.  For to want to do A is not merely to want to be in some terminal state.  It is, as we 
have seen, not to want to be in any mere state, but rather to want what is essentially a goal-
directed course of action: “enough A-ing to have A-ed,” as we were led to put it.  And equally, 
to want to do A is not merely to want that the relevant course of action should occur just 
anyhow.  It is, as we have seen, to want to be oneself the source of the relevant action: to want 
it to be one’s own doing.  When I want to do A, in short, the content of my want is of a form 
such that the world can only come to conform to that content insofar as it not only comes to 
be a certain way, but does so as the outcome of a goal-directed process guided by the agent.  
Indeed, even this way of putting the matter leaves the outcome and the process too external to 
one another: to represent my doing A is to represent, as it were, a kind of state of affairs 
whose obtaining is my having intentionally caused it to be.
19   
  These observations do not constitute an objection to just any philosopher who asserts 
that an intentional action is a bodily movement with certain psychological causes, but they do 
present difficulties for philosophers who put forward this proposition in a reductive spirit, as a 
step towards an analysis of the concept of intentional action in terms of concepts better 
understood – philosophers who seek, by means of this connection, to give a substantive 
                                                                                                                                                       
answers would set off a chain of difficulties similar to the one we describe below.  
19 Certain sophisticated versions of the causal theory attempt to capture something like this point by making the 
content of the motivating want or intention self-referential: by stipulating, e.g., that I do A intentionally only if I 
am moved to do A by a desire that this very desire should be the cause of my doing A (compare Harman 1976, 
Searle 1983, Ch. 3, Velleman 1989, Setiya 2003).  We believe that this sort of maneuver would fall prey to a 
version of the difficulty we have raised, since the phrase “doing A” remains in the content clause, and this sort of 
content is one to which the causal theorist is not entitled to appeal.  Our aim here, however, is simply to show 
how the presence of this phrase makes a difficulty for the most straightforward and natural version of the causal 
theory.  More complicated versions of the theory make the difficulty harder to detect, but we believe that they do 
not ultimately eliminate it. “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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answer to Wittgenstein’s question.
20  For they show that the relevant psychological causes 
must include representations whose nature can be explained only by appeal to the notion of 
intentional action itself: representations which represent their object as “to be done” in a sense 
which must mean precisely “to be done intentionally.”
21  But if we cannot hope to give an 
account of wanting to do A that is independent of the idea of intentional action, then neither 
can we hope to give a reductive account of intentional action as a matter of movement caused 
in the right way by such wantings.  An account of what it is to want to do A must rather 
presuppose an account of action, an account of the kind of event (S’s doing A) whose coming 
to be is the subject’s intentionally causing it to be.
22 
 
4.    Action, Form, and Goodness 
We can hardly claim to have shown that causal theorists have no room for maneuver in 
responding to this difficulty, but we hope at least to have brought out a significant 
commitment that such theorists must undertake: they are committed to treating the sort of 
object at which an agent primarily aims, a doing of A, not as an unproblematic given, but as 
something itself requiring analysis.  If the foregoing considerations are sound, constructing an 
account of action that eliminates reference to this sort of object is more difficult than is 
commonly supposed.  The ease with which we pass from “my raising my arm” to “my arm’s 
rising” can encourage us to think that we can hang onto the sort of thing whose coming to 
exist would satisfy an agent’s aim while subtracting its intentionality; but in fact, as we have 
                                                 
20 Some philosophers who would regard themselves as advocates of a causal theory of action do not have this 
ambition: Donald Davidson (1980b, 1980c) and Jennifer Hornsby (1980, 1995), for instance, argue that the 
intentional actions must have certain psychological causes, but do not aim for a reductive account of intentional 
action in these terms.  What we have been saying does not constitute an objection to such views, though we 
believe that the kind of investigation of action we go on to propose in the following sections does, if it is sound, 
raise questions about the sort of theorizing about action that these authors undertake.  For the present, however, 
our interest is in the kind of causal theory that aims at reduction.  For it is the assumption that this sort of causal 
theory is possible which supports the widespread conviction that doing something intentionally is not a special 
and irreducible kind of event or process, but an event or process of some more generic kind with certain special 
causes.  This is the conviction we ultimately aim to challenge. 
21 Difficulties would also arise, we believe, if we investigated the notion of cause on which such an account must 
rely.  It is widely recognized that not just any sort of causal relation will do: the cause must operate “in the right 
way.”  Davidson famously doubted whether there could be a noncircular account of what “the right way” must 
be (1980b, p. 79).  Contemporary causal theorists tend to suppose that Davidson was wrong about this.  The 
foregoing considerations are an attempt to show, from a different angle, why he was right to doubt the possibility 
of reduction. 
22 For a more systematic argument for this conclusion, to which the present discussion is much indebted, see “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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seen, the sort of object that an agent primarily aims to realize is precisely: an action consisting 
of phases ordered intentionally toward a certain end (his having A-ed).  No doubt it is true 
that, where such an object has come to exist, it will be possible to describe the movements 
that have occurred in terms which do not imply that an intention has been realized therein.  
But it does not follow that it must be possible to give an account of what it consists in for an 
intentional action to have occurred employing only such terms; and indeed, we have seen at 
least prima facie reason to suppose that this is not possible. 
  The importance of this result, for our purposes, is that it forces us to face anew the 
question what intentional action is.  The upshot of the last section is that we cannot explain 
the nature of this sort of event or process – an agent’s intentionally doing A – by appeal to the 
idea of some unproblematic kind of happening with certain specific psychological causes.  
Rather, we must explain the nature of the relevant psychological causes by appeal to their 
directedness toward precisely this sort of process or event.  But this simply returns us to the 
question how to characterize the sort of process or event in question.  The schema “S is 
(intentionally) doing A” marks the object of our interest, but invoking it does not by itself 
clarify how expressions of this form function, or what sort of conceptual surrounding they 
need to get a grip.   
  Our aim in the remainder of the paper is to argue for a broadly Aristotelian view of the 
required surrounding: a view on which the general notion of a goal-directed action is 
explained by linking it with the idea of the form of the subject that acts, and the more specific 
notion of an intentional action must be explained by linking it with the idea of a form that 
essentially involves the capacity for self-consciousness.  This amounts to a fundamentally 
different sort of approach to understanding action from the sort pursued by causal theorists: 
the aim is not to specify conditions under which some not-intrinsically-intentional process 
amounts to an intentional action, but rather to explain intentional action as an irreducibly 
distinctive type of process, one that is to be characterized by bringing out the specific 
implications involved in positing a process of this kind, and by clarifying what other sorts of 
propositions must also be true of something that can be the subject of such processes.  The 
guise of the good thesis will turn out to be a commitment that follows from this Aristotelian 
approach to saying what action is. 
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  To bring out the attractions of this approach, it will be useful first to reflect on how to 
characterize the wider genus of which intentional action is a species.  Contemporary 
discussions of the guise of the good thesis often treat it as an isolated claim about rational, 
intentional action.  If that were right, the thesis would look implausible from the start.  For 
clearly not all action is rational action.  Animals and infants lack the powers distinctive of a 
rational agent: they cannot deliberate about reasons, form prior intentions, or reflect self-
consciously on what they are doing.  But although they are not rational agents, it would be 
perverse to deny that they are agents in some sense: not just the passive subjects of various 
events and processes, but the active source of certain happenings in which they are involved.  
When the dog runs excitedly to the door or the infant child turns toward the sound of its 
mother’s voice, these are clearly self-originated, goal-directed actions of a sort.  If they are 
actions, however, and if “action” here does not mean something utterly different from what it 
means in the rational case, then it seems that an account of rational action should conform to a 
shape that applies, at least in its general outlines, to the nonrational case as well.  But if 
nonrational action can be accounted for without any reference to the notion of goodness, why 
must reference to this notion suddenly appear in the rational case? 
  This line of thought suggests that a principled defense of the guise of the good thesis 
should begin with a defense of a more basic principle, one that posits a connection between 
goodness and action-in-general.  And this, in fact, is how we will argue for the thesis: by 
showing that it is the product of (i) a general point about the connection between the idea of 
action and the idea of the good of a thing and (ii) a special point about the shape this 
connection takes in the rational case.  Briefly, the thought is this.  The most general idea of an 
action is the idea of a movement or change which in some sense comes “from the subject,” 
rather than merely being the result of forces acting on the subject “from without.”  But this 
distinction between self-movement or self-change, on the one hand, and movement or change 
whose cause is external, on the other, must be drawn against the background of an idea of 
form which brings with it a standard of goodness.  This connection holds for action in general, 
but in the rational case it takes a particular shape.  For to be a rational creature means just this: 
to live by thought, which is to say by the employment of concepts.  Hence the shape which 
the general connection between action and goodness takes in a rational creature will be one 
that involves thought: rational action is a kind of movement that has its source in a subject’s “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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power to bring things under the concept good.  The remaining pages attempt to fill in the 
picture just sketched.  The rest of this section discusses the first part of the argument: the 
general connection between self-movement and goodness.  The next section discusses the 
special form this connection takes in the rational case. 
 
Characterizing self-movement.  There is broad agreement among contemporary philosophers 
of action that autonomous, rational action is not just an isolated topic, but one species of a 
wider genus that also includes more primitive forms of goal-directed activity.  But how can 
we define the wider category?  What is “goal-directed activity,” and how is it distinguished 
from other kinds of worldly happening?   
  It will not do simply to say that a goal-directed activity is anything that can fill the “A” 
position in the schema  
(7) S  is doing A. 
It is true that such propositions in general describe the here and now by relating it to a 
possible future situation: to assert a proposition of form (7) is to posit an outcome toward 
which S is tending: namely, its having done A.  And by the same token, to assert (7) is to leave 
logical space for the possibility of failure: it can be true that S was doing A but never did A.  
But not every instance of this schema is goal-directed in the interesting sense.  The bare 
schema “S is doing A” admits of such substitutions as “The tree is falling over,” “The smoke 
is rising to the ceiling,” “The tidal wave is rushing toward the shore”; and these are clearly not 
instances of genuinely goal-directed activity.  To count as genuinely goal-directed, one wants 
to say, a movement or change must in some sense come from the subject, and must be for the 
sake of the end.  This, indeed, is a traditional way of defining an agent: agents are self-
movers, things that themselves pursue ends.  But when does a movement count as a self-
movement, or as done for the sake of an end? 
  Having rejected the sort of approach that seeks to specify when a movement counts as 
an intentional action by appeal to its psychological causes, and having in any case widened 
our focus from intentional action in particular to goal-directed activity generally, we must 
seek a characterization of self-movement that does not appeal to specific causes, but rather 
identifies self-movement as a distinctive type of event or process.  We must, that is, identify a 
kind of event-description that is as such a description of a movement by a subject for the sake “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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of an end, a type of proposition of form (7) from which we can correctly infer S is doing A 
goal-directedly.  But what role does the proposition S is doing A have to be playing in order 
for this adverbial attachment to be appropriate?   
  We can make progress on this question by observing that the truth of some but not all 
progressive propositions can be explained by adverting to further, more embracing 
progressive propositions with the same subject.  Thus we can offer such explanations as 
Why is the plant budding? 
—Because it is growing a new leaf. 
Why is the cat crouching there waiting? 
—Because it is stalking a bird. 
Why is he mixing eggs and flour?  
—Because he’s baking a cake. 
But of course we do not suppose that we can explain the rain’s falling to the earth by the fact 
that it is watering the plants, or indeed by reference to any larger purpose belonging to the 
rain.  To suppose that we could explain the rain’s falling in this way would be to take, as they 
say, an animistic view of nature.  And nor will we suppose that the rain’s falling to the earth 
itself explains the lesser phases in which this process consists: to suppose that the rain is 
falling past the treetops because it is falling to the earth would be equally animistic.  These 
observations are clues to the solution of our problem: they suggest that a subject S is capable 
of the kind of goal-directed activity of which inanimate nature is incapable just if it is a 
potential subject of explanations of the form  
(8) S  is doing A* because S is doing A 
where, intuitively, doing A* is a way or means or part of doing A.  We can call such 
propositions judgments of individual teleology, for they explain a lesser activity in which an 
individual subject is engaged by linking it to a more-encompassing activity in which that 
same subject is engaged, and thereby represent the accomplishment of the more-
encompassing activity as a sort of end whose pursuit can explain things done in the service of 
it.
23   
                                                 
23 There may be explanations which fit the grammatical pattern of (8) but which do not imply a teleological 
relationship between the lesser process and the greater one: for instance, “The dryer is shaking because it is 
running its spin-cycle.”  If this is a genuine explanation, however, it seems intuitively clear that it is an “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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  This observation suggests a way of stating a condition under which a progressive 
proposition of form (7) ascribes goal-directed activity to its subject: it does so just if it can 
figure on the right-hand side of a proposition of form (8) – i.e., if it can figure as the explainer 
of a less embracing progressive with the same subject.
24  A proposition that can play this role 
represents its subject as engaged in a process which can explain its own realization, a process 
that can be the cause of its own coming to be, in whatever sense of cause is implied by the 
“because” in such explanations.  And it seems that for any temporally-extended process of A-
ing, if the process is goal-directed, there will be some true explanation of this form in which 
the process figures.  For if the process of A-ing is temporally extended, there will be moments 
at which S is A-ing but it is not yet true that S has A-ed – moments at which the process is 
underway but not yet complete.  But if there is no part or phase of this process, A*, which is 
occurring at some such moment and which can be explained in a judgment of form (8), then it 
seems that there can be no basis for saying that the accumulation of parts or phases toward the 
completion of the larger process, S’s having A-ed, is goal-directed: the aim of the whole 
played no role in the realization of the parts.  So it seems that, at least for temporally-extended 
processes of doing A, it is a necessary and sufficient condition for their being goal-directed 
activities that they should be capable of figuring in true explanations of form (8).
25    
  An indication that this characterization of goal-directedness is on the right track is that 
it gives a clear interpretation to the intuitive ideas that a goal-directed movement must (i) 
come from the subject and (ii) be made for the sake of the end.  For on the one hand, we have 
                                                                                                                                                       
explanation of a different kind from the kind offered when a proposition of form (8) is used to mark a 
teleological connection: the dryer’s shaking is not, intuitively speaking, a way or means or part of its completing 
its spin cycle.  One test of whether an explanation of form (8) is genuinely teleological is whether it can be 
transposed into an explicitly teleological form, as in: 
(8’)  S is doing A* in order to do A. 
This will be possible at least in the case of animate teleology: there may be reservations about making the 
transposition in the case of plants.  But even there, it seems that such an explicitly teleological description should 
apply, if not at the level of the individual plant, then at least at the level of the kind to which it belongs: 
(8’’)  Ks do A* in order to do A.  (They grow leaves in order to absorb sunlight, roots to 
take   up water and nutrients from the soil, etc.) 
A fuller treatment of these topics would need to investigate the special features of the explanatory structure that 
exists when a proposition of form (8) is used in the way that we intuitively recognize as teleological.  We do not 
attempt this here, however: our aim is just to sketch a general approach and bring out some of its attractions. 
24 Compare the characterization suggested at Thompson 2008, p. 112. 
25 The consequences of this point for the understanding of intentional action are explored in greater depth in 
Lavin, “Must There Be Basic Action?” (MS). “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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identified a kind of explanation that says why a subject is up to one thing by adverting to 
something else that same subject is up to, rather than by tracing the subject’s activity to the 
influence of some other thing.  And on the other hand, this kind of explanation says why the 
subject is up to something by saying what further end the subject’s doing that thing would 
serve.  Moreover, our characterization seems to be extensionally correct.  For, in the first 
place, judgments that ascribe intentional actions meet our criterion: my intentionally doing 
one thing can explain my intentionally doing another thing.  But our criterion is also satisfied 
by other kinds of progressive judgments: as the previous examples indicate, this general form 
of explanation can apply to nonrational animals and indeed to plants.  Its application marks 
the feature of living things we are tracking when we say that what goes on with them is 
subject to teleological explanation.   
  Our criterion thus captures what is right in the idea that the sphere of the goal-directed 
is wider than the sphere of the intentional. At the same time, it leaves us with an agenda of 
problems: to explain, in an equally abstract way, what distinguishes the category of goal-
directed progressives that ascribe, not merely the kind of purposiveness that we find in plant 
life, but the more determinate kind that we find among animate creatures, ones that can act in 
response to the promptings of sensation and appetite; and again, to explain what distinguishes 
within the latter category the further subcategory of animate goal-directed progressives that 
ascribe rational, intentional action. 
 
Action and form.  For the moment, however, our aim is not to take up these special problems 
but to make a general point about the conditions under which any judgment implying goal-
directedness gets a grip.  The general point is this: judgments ascribing goal-directed self-
movement or self-change only have application to things to which a certain kind of form is 
attributable, a form that in turn makes room for a notion of what is good for things of that 
kind. 
  We will try to give a principled account of the connection between goal-directedness 
and form in a moment, but first let us simply observe that, for many such judgments, the point 
is obviously true.  If we begin by considering, not rational action, but the more rudimentary 
kinds of goal-directed self-change or self-movement characteristic of plants and animals, it is 
plain enough that recognizing them involves bringing to bear a conception of the nature of the “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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kind in question.  In recognizing that a certain plant is, e.g., budding – as opposed to, say, 
developing a cancer – we are relating what is going on with it to a more general conception of 
how things go in the life of that kind of plant.  In recognizing a cat as pursuing a mouse or as 
fleeing in response to a loud noise, we regard processes in which it is presently engaged as 
organized by general aims that belong to it as a cat.  In these sorts of instances, at least, the 
general idea of processes in which a certain individual figures as an agent pursuing a goal 
seems to get a grip only against a certain sort of background: only inasmuch as the individual 
in question is regarded as an instance of a certain kind of thing, a kind with a certain 
characteristic form or nature, a kind to which certain ends and activities belong as such.   
  It is one of Aristotle’s characteristic thoughts that ascriptions of self-movement or 
self-change to individuals presuppose such a background: for he holds that, in general, the 
topics of movement and change are to be understood against the background of the natures of 
things, where a nature is a “principle of motion and change,” so that movements and changes 
that do not come about by chance are understood as the realizations of potentialities belonging 
to the natures of things that move and change; and he holds that the possibility of self-
movement and self-change must be understood against the background of the special sort of 
form or nature that he calls a “soul.”
26  This Aristotelian thought is the inspiration for our 
account, but our aim here is not to do Aristotle exegesis, but to show why the thought might 
be attractive in its own right.  If ascriptions of self-movement to individuals presuppose a 
conception of the forms that those individuals bear, why is this so?  In the remainder of this 
section, we will sketch an account of this connection.  Our argument will be less than decisive 
at several points, but it should at least clarify why, given certain general views about the role 
of kinds in explaining the activities of individuals, the idea of a connection between self-
movement, form, and goodness will seem compelling. 
  The first step is to note the striking and remarkable way in which ascriptions of goal-
directed activity link a subject’s present to a certain future condition toward which it is 
tending.  It is not merely that, if S is doing A goal-directedly, and if nothing interferes, then it 
                                                 
26 For the idea of nature as a principle of movement and change, see Physics, II-III, and for the connection 
between nature and form, see especially Physics II.1 and II.7.  For the idea of the soul as the form of a living 
thing, see De Anima II, in particular II.4 for the idea of the soul as the cause of specifically vital movement and 
change.  See also the discussions of the general connection between nature and teleological (or final) explanation 
in Physics II.8, and of the connection between teleological understanding and the soul in Parts of Animals I.1. “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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will eventually be true that S did A: that much is also true of “The smoke is rising to the 
ceiling.”  What is distinctive of goal-directed progressives is their implication that aspects of 
S’s present activity are happening because they tend toward this future situation (S’s having 
done A).  Now, that should sound strange: how can a situation that does not yet exist explain a 
situation that does exist?  A standard sort of objection to teleological explanation is that it 
would require some sort of “backward causation” or “pull from the future,”  and that such 
notions are unintelligible.  But if we are convinced that progressive propositions which imply 
goal-directedness are sometimes true – and it is hard to see how we could even begin to think 
about living things and their activities without taking this for granted – then our task must be 
to understand what it can be about a subject that allows such propositions to be true of it.  
What can it be about an individual here and now in virtue of which its present activity is 
explained by an as-yet-unrealized end toward which it is tending?   
  We can begin to see how this might be made intelligible by noting that goal-directed 
progressives characterize a subject here and now by relating it, not necessarily to the actual 
future, but rather to its own future – to a possible outcome that would count as something the 
subject itself effected, rather than something that merely happened to it.  Part of the point here 
is not special to goal-directed progressives in particular: in general, a progressive proposition 
of the form 
(7)  S is doing A  
is not necessarily falsified because the relevant future state of affairs (S’s having done A) does 
not come to obtain; it is falsified only if this was not the state toward which S was tending, the 
state which would have come to obtain had nothing interfered with its activity.  In this sense, 
any progressive proposition of form (7) relates its subject, not to the actual future whatever it 
may be, but rather to a possible future that would count as the subject’s own.  Now, the 
crucial Aristotelian thought is that the distinction between a future that counts as the subject’s 
own and one that does not must be drawn against the background of a conception of what the 
subject is and of what belongs to being that kind of thing – that is, of the form it bears and the 
nature of things that bear this form.  This claim may initially sound dark and metaphysical, 
but we can bring it down to earth by restating it as a point about the relation between truths of 
the form we have been considering and truths of certain other characteristic shapes.  The 
thought, in effect, is that where there are truths of the form (7), there must also be true “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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judgments of form-attribution of the form 
(9)  S is an F 
and true form-characterizing judgments of the form 
(10)  Fs do  (in conditions C) 
where the description of the activity characteristic of the kind, , need not in general be 
identical to the description that characterizes what the individual is doing (A), although in the 
simplest sort of case it might be.  In the more general case, doing A will be some specific form 
or manifestation of -ing, as rolling down this hill is a specific manifestation of rolling (S is 
rolling down this hill; S is a bronze sphere; Bronze spheres roll (when on uneven ground)).  
The relation that must obtain between A and some corresponding  would not be easy to 
specify, but in any case the Aristotelian thought is: there must be one.   
  Propositions of form (10) are general judgments about Fs, but they are stated without a 
quantifier, and are meant to state what are intuitively truths about the nature of Fs, truths that 
hold “if nothing interferes” or “other things equal” in the sense that they hold, not necessarily 
without exception, but rather in such a way that an F’s doing  in conditions C is to be 
expected, while an F’s not doing  in conditions C calls for special explanation.
27  The idea is 
that if propositions of forms (7), (9), and (10) hold, and if A-ing is a form or manifestation of 
-ing, then it is intelligible how it could already be true to say of S that it is headed toward the 
condition of having A-ed, and will reach that condition if nothing interferes.  A subject can be 
tending toward a certain result, in the manner of (7), even though that result may not actually 
come about, precisely because a subject can have certain general tendencies, where describing 
a tendency is describing not how things will come out in any given instance but how things do 
come out if nothing interferes.  But – the Aristotelian thought goes – general tendencies 
belong to individuals only inasmuch as those individuals bear some general form: for the very 
idea of a tendency is the idea of what happens “if nothing interferes,” and the distinction 
between interference and noninterference would have no application to an individual thing if 
                                                 
27 Such judgments are characteristically expressed using sentences of the type linguists call “generics.”  For an 
overview of the characteristic significance of such sentences and the problems they raise, see the Introduction to 
Carlson and Pelletier 1995.  For illuminating discussion of the relevance of generic propositions to the 
understanding of teleology in living things, see Moravscik 1994 and Thompson 2008, Part I.  The more general 
Aristotelian thought that, to make sense of the notion of an individual substance undergoing motion or change, 
we must see that substance as belonging to a certain substantial kind characterized by various general ways of “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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there were not some basis for distinguishing between those episodes in its existence which 
manifest the sort of thing it is and those which do not.  The case where nothing interferes is 
the case where a thing manifests its own nature, the traits that characterize the sort of thing it 
is.  So in committing ourselves to the distinction between interference and noninterference, 
we commit ourselves to regarding individuals as bearers of forms, and the forms themselves 
as characterized by general principles of movement and change, principles which are 
explanatory, other things equal, of the activities of the individual bearers of the forms in 
question. 
  The connections described so far hold not just for individuals that can be the subject of 
goal-directed progressives, but for any individual that can be the subject of progressive 
judgments of the form S is doing A: this attribution of a process-in-progress is possible only 
against the background of various general tendencies, and such tendencies can belong to an 
individual only in virtue of its being a certain kind of thing, the bearer of some general form.  
The special problem about goal-directed progressives was their implication that the outcome 
toward which S tends in doing A is in some sense what explains the parts or phases in which 
the realization of this tendency consists.  The problem of understanding how goal-directed 
progressives can be true is thus the problem of understanding, not just how a certain future 
can be a subject’s own, but how it can be so in a way that explains the subject’s present 
activity.   
  Now, if the general problem about how a certain future can be a subject’s own is 
solved by noting that subjects of change belong to kinds characterized by general tendencies 
to change, we should expect this special problem to be solved by noting that subjects capable 
of goal-directed activity belong to kinds of a special sort, kinds characterized by tendencies 
with a distinctive structure.  Indeed, the general shape of the required structure follows from 
the very statement of the problem.  How can the outcome toward which S is tending explain 
the occurrence of the process that proceeds towards it, and explain it in such a way that the 
whole process is intelligible as a case of self-movement or self-change, a process “coming 
from the subject” in the intuitive sense that we are seeking to explicate?  Well, in the first 
place, the tendencies that characterize the kind to which S belongs must be tendencies toward 
some definite outcome or final condition, not merely tendencies that have no intrinsic limit, 
                                                                                                                                                       
moving and changing has been defended in a contemporary context in Wiggins 2001, Chapter 3.   “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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like the tendency of fire to spread or of iron to rust.  They must, as we can put it, be 
tendencies toward a definite end.  Furthermore, they must be tendencies whose being set in 
motion is in some sense due to the subject itself.  They must, in other words, be tendencies of 
a special sort, which we can call powers, to mark the fact that the normal cause of their 
coming to operate (or, as we can say, to act) is not just some alien force acting on the subject, 
but a cause whose operation itself expresses the subject’s nature.
28   
  What this might mean, more concretely, is that the cause which summons a power to 
act does not depend on conditions whose holding is simply an accident given the nature of the 
kind of thing in question.  That its powers are brought to act must be something for which the 
kind by its nature provides: if a given power’s acting depends on its being in condition C, then 
the kind must have further powers which tend to secure that C holds – as always, if nothing 
interferes.  And conversely: if P is a power of a kind K, then the acts of P must themselves be 
explanatory (other things equal) of Ks being in a condition in which various of their other 
powers operate.  This is what secures that the end toward which an act tends is explanatory of 
the processes that contribute to its own realization: for by contributing to the existence of the 
kind of thing whose nature it is to realize that sort of end, the achievement of that end is, in a 
sense, the explanation of itself – not through some occult form of backwards causation, but by 
being an effect whose coming to be contributes to the very conditions that make its own 
coming to be no accident.  In short, on this broadly Aristotelian view, a subject that is capable 
of goal-directed activity must belong to a kind characterized by powers that form a sort of 
                                                 
28 Once again, it will plainly be a complicated matter to say how an instance of goal-directedly A-ing must be 
related to the general description of what a given power is a power to do () if the A-ing is to instance or belong 
to -ing.  Indeed, the potential complexity involved here will presumably increase with each step up the “ladder 
of nature”: from plants, to nonrational animals, to rational animals.  In the vegetative case, what any individual 
plant can be said to do goal-directedly will probably cleave pretty closely to what it belongs to the general 
powers of things of that kind to do.  Already in the case of nonrational animals, however, the presence of the 
power of perception (to say nothing of capacities for learning, adaptation, etc.) will introduce possibilities of 
goal-directed activity which have no direct counterpart in the kind: for, e.g., in virtue of being able to perceive a 
certain mouse, an individual cat can get into the act of hunting that mouse.  Whatever powers of cat-kind this 
activity instances will certainly not be powers to do that: they will presumably involve only a power to hunt mice 
or possibly just to hunt things that meet certain general parameters.  And the distance between any general 
description of the power exercised and the appropriate descriptions of the action undertaken will receive another 
and much more radical multiplication in a rational creature, for an individual rational creature will be in a 
position to determine the how and the wherefore of its action in all sorts of ways that are not anticipated in the 
powers belonging to its kind.  Nevertheless, if the Aristotelian view is right, representing a rational creature as 
engaged in intentional action will involve representing what it is doing as in some way connected with the 
operation of powers characteristic of its kind.  We say more to develop and defend this view about rational 
creatures in the next section.  For further discussion, see Boyle, “Rational Animals and Rational Powers” (MS). “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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self-sustaining system.  For it is against this background that the idea of a subject capable of 
moving or changing itself becomes intelligible: acts of self-movement or self-change are 
understood as movements or changes that are explicable by reference to such powers, and the 
goal-directedness of such acts consists in the fact that their tending toward a certain end is no 
accident given the general nature of the kind of subject that undergoes them. 
  This description of the structure of powers that characterizes a kind capable of goal-
directed activity is highly abstract, but it should become more tangible if we reflect on how 
aptly it describes the sort of order we find in living things. Any given kind of living thing is 
characterized by a manifold of powers directed toward various ends, powers which constitute 
a sort of self-maintaining system: one such that the realization of any one of its ends supplies 
the condition for the realization of various others, and these in turn of others, in such a way 
that the kind “makes itself exist,” so to speak.  This self-maintenance occurs at two levels: 
first, individuals of the kind in question maintain their own existence through such processes 
as nourishing themselves, defending themselves from threats, healing from injuries, etc.; and 
secondly, the kind itself maintains its existence through reproductive processes in which 
members of the kind make others like themselves.  For any given kind of living thing, we can 
describe powers that it has which subserve each of these two sorts of self-maintenance, 
powers whose various acts contribute to fulfilling the conditions in which life of that kind can 
continue.  And it is characteristic of these powers that they not only contribute variously to the 
maintenance of the kind of living thing in question, but thereby contribute to the maintenance 
of themselves and one another in sound order: by seeking out and consuming nourishing food, 
a creature makes it possible for its injuries to heal; by healing its injuries, it makes it possible 
to seek out and consume nourishing food, etc.  Indeed, this reciprocal interdependence 
extends to all of the essential powers of a living thing, for precisely insofar as they are 
essential, they are each needed to contribute to the maintenance of the system of which they 
are powers, but equally they each depend on all the other powers to operate in a way that 
maintains that system, and thus makes each power possible.
29   
  The foregoing has been a highly programmatic attempt to characterize the background 
that must be in place if there is to be room for the ascription of goal-directed activity to 
                                                 
29 The resulting system thus constitutes the kind of unity that Kant called a “natural purpose,” which is “the 
cause and effect of itself.”  Compare Kant, Critique of Judgment (1987), Part II, Division I, esp. §§3-4. “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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individuals.  Our proposals are obviously disputable at many points.  Our purpose has merely 
been to sketch an approach, one that we hope looks recognizably Aristotelian, and that 
contrasts in important respects with the sort of approach pursued by contemporary causal 
theorists.  Whereas the causal theorist’s approach to characterizing action is reductive, this 
approach might be called holistic: it aims, not to replace talk of intentional processes (or 
teleological processes more generally) with something less mysterious, but to dispel the air of 
mystery in a different way, by showing how ascriptions of the relevant processes have a place 
within an intelligible system of types of proposition – a kind of system that we cannot easily 
do without if we hope to make sense of living things at all.  If we are right that progressive 
propositions about individuals presuppose general truths of form (10), and that goal-directed 
progressives, in particular, can apply where such truths characterize a certain sort of self-
maintaining system of powers, then some such system must be the background against which 
goal-directed progressives can be true of individuals at all. 
 
Form and goodness.  Our aim was not only to bring out a connection between goal-directed 
activity and the presence of a certain sort of form, but also to bring out a connection between 
this sort of form and the application of the concept good.  We can now finally turn to this 
latter connection.   
  It is not a new suggestion that what it is for S to be good depends on what kind of 
thing S is.  Peter Geach famously suggested that “good” is a “logically attributive adjective” 
which has sense only in relation to some substantial kind, and which can vary in sense 
depending on which kind is in question; and a number of other authors have argued that at 
least certain uses of evaluative language in application to the states and activities of 
individuals presuppose judgments about the kinds to which they belong and the natures of 
those kinds.
30  Thus a rosebush is said to be doing poorly if it does not bud and flower in the 
season proper to rosebushes, and a human being’s tooth-development is said to be defective if 
he does not come to have the normal thirty-two adult teeth.  The evident aptness of such 
evaluations, as far as they go, suggests that at least some sorts of evaluations are kind-relative.  
But it certainly seems a long and dubious way from here to the topic of intentional action; and 
                                                 
30 See Geach 1956 and Anscombe 1958, and for more recent representatives of this “Aristotelian naturalist” 
tradition, Foot 2002 and Thompson 2008, Part I. “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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lacking a principled account of why the kind to which individuals belong should constitute a 
standard for the deeds of those individuals, it is easy to doubt whether a kind-relative notion 
of goodness has any bearing on the deliberation of a rational agent. 
  We will consider how these issues bear on the deliberation of a rational agent in the 
next section.  Before turning to that topic, however, we need to say something general about 
why, if being a goal-directed agent presupposes being the bearer of a form in the sense 
described above, such forms should equally constitute evaluative standards for the acts of the 
agents who bear them.  The answer will be, in a way, disappointingly quick.  It is that this is 
something we have already conceded in all but name in assigning the notion of form the place 
we have given it in our account.  To represent an individual as the bearer of a form, in the 
sense we have been specifying, is to represent that individual as a sort of thing that as such 
pursues certain ends, ends that stand, when things are going well, in a sort of balance or 
equilibrium, a balance on which the existence of such things depends.  To the extent that such 
a thing achieves those ends, it succeeds in pursuits that belong to it as such.  And by the same 
token, to the extent that it fails, it fails in pursuits that belong to it as such.  Inasmuch as the 
form in question is essential to individuals that bear it, these pursuits belong inalienably to 
those individuals: they cannot cease to be pursuers of these ends without ceasing to be.  And 
inasmuch as their particular doings are to be understood as acts of powers directed toward 
certain general ends, these ends will be the measures of those acts, in the way that any act is a 
success or failure in virtue of its fulfilling or not fulfilling its end.  That attributing a form to a 
thing, in this sense, involves attributing to it something that is a standard or measure of its 
activity, a standard relative to which it may be acting well or poorly, is thus a truism, not a 
controversial addition to what has already been said.   
  A certain standard of goodness for a thing follows inevitably from its belonging to a 
kind characterized by a functionally-organized system of powers: this, we suppose, is the crux 
of Aristotle’s famous “function argument.”
31  If the objection to this is that it illegitimately 
infers an “ought” from an “is,” we are not sure that we understand the charge.  The sort of 
“saying what a thing is” that is at issue here is: ascribing to it a certain form, where a form is 
something that as such involves directedness toward certain ends.  If the question is supposed 
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to be why the thing at issue ought to pursue those ends, we ask: from what standpoint is this 
question posed?  If the thing in question genuinely is a bearer of such-and-such a form, then it 
is a pursuer of such-and-such ends, and essentially so.  It can no more renounce these ends 
than it can cease to be itself.  But if the objection is that there can be no such thing as a “form” 
in the sense that would validate these claims, then we would want to dispute this, though to 
confront the various challenges to this notion would be too large a task to take on here.  We 
hope the foregoing discussion suggests, at any rate, that the costs of giving up this notion 
would be significant.  For it suggests that the notion belongs, not simply to some strange pre-
modern metaphysical outlook, but to a characterization of the underlying structure of forms of 
thought and speech that we all constantly employ, and whose soundness few philosophers 
seriously question.  If the Aristotelian standpoint on goal-directed activity is right, then to 
regard something as a goal-directed agent is necessarily to regard it as the bearer of a certain 
form, and thus as directed toward a certain system of goods, goods the pursuit of which 
orients, more or less remotely, its various particular doings.   
 
5.   Goodness and reason 
But what does all this have to do with the claim that we must act under the guise of the good?  
How do the points we have made about the connection between self-movement and goodness 
underwrite a connection between intentional action and the representation of something as 
good?  The connection, we shall suggest, turns on a point about the special form that this 
connection takes in a creature capable of reasoning about how to act. 
  Human beings are rational creatures; our capacity for action is a rational capacity.  
What does this mean?  Thomas Aquinas explains the point as follows:   
The will is a rational appetite.  Now every appetite is only of something good.  
The reason of this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a 
person desirous of a thing towards that thing.  Now every inclination is to 
something like and suitable to the thing inclined…  But it must be noted that, 
since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a 
form existing in the nature of things, while the sensitive appetite, as also the 
intellective or rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an 
apprehended form.  Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good 
existing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is 
apprehended.  Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as 
good.
32 
This passage is useful for our purposes because it argues for the guise of the good thesis in 
just the way that we have been seeking to argue for it: by deriving it from a more general 
thought about the connection between goodness and the inclination to do something, together 
with a thought about the special character of this connection in the rational case.  The focus of 
this last section will be on this connection between the thought that we possess a faculty of 
rational inclination and the claim that we pursue the apprehended or apparent good.   
 
Kinds of inclination.  Aquinas says that whereas the “natural appetite” of nonsentient agents 
like plants results from “a form existing in the nature of things,” and tends toward a good that 
exists in them simpliciter, both the “sensitive appetite” of nonrational animals and the 
“rational appetite” of human beings follow, in different ways, from an “apprehended form” 
and tend toward “a good which is apprehended.”  His point can be expressed as follows.  A 
plant just belongs to a certain living kind, a kind that has a particular way of inhabiting its 
environment, taking in nourishment, making possible its own growth and reproduction, and so 
on.  In representing a certain plant as engaged in some teleologically-structured process 
(growing a new leaf, taking in nourishment from the soil, etc.), we see what is happening with 
it as oriented toward obtaining something suitable to that kind of plant.  We thus represent the 
prospect of obtaining the relevant good as in a certain way already active in what the plant is 
doing here and now, even though the good in question has yet to be obtained: the plant’s 
present activity is already informed by its natural tendency, as a plant of such-and-such a 
kind, to pursue certain goods.  Or speaking in Aquinas’s way: the form of the relevant good 
already exists in the plant’s nature, as something toward which it is naturally inclined. 
  A nonrational animal too acts in fulfillment of various teleologically-oriented 
inclinations, but it stands in a different kind of relationship to these inclinations in virtue of 
having the powers of sensation and appetite.  It does not just inhabit an environment; it can 
perceive its environment and react to it.  It does not just take in nourishment; it can seek it out.  
In general, animals do not just have inclinations to pursue certain goods as a part of their 
nature; their nature involves their apprehending particular things that are good for them 
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(which is not to say: apprehending that particular things are good for them) and pursuing 
those apprehended things.  So those things toward which an animal is inclined – the forms 
that its inclinations seek to realize – are not just fixed by its nature but are present to it in 
virtue of particular perceptible things having made an impression on it.  In this sense, its way 
of life essentially involves apprehension: it pursues apprehended forms. 
  A rational creature is different again.  Such a creature does not merely have certain 
purposes that it naturally pursues, as a plant does, and it does not merely feel appetites for 
perceived goods, as a nonrational animal does.  A rational creature is one that apprehends its 
environment and its good in a still more profound sense: it is a creature that brings its 
representations under general concepts, and this means that it can not only acquire particular 
representations of the world through perception but think in the abstract about what is true, 
and also that it can not merely have particular desires but reflect on how to attain particular 
goods, on how to combine various sorts of goods in a life well-lived, and on the notion of a 
good as such.   With these powers, moreover, comes the capacity for a distinctive kind of self-
movement, one that involves the ability to think about what to pursue and how to obtain it.  
The fact that rational creatures do not merely have certain things that are goods for them, or 
merely desire things that are in fact good – the fact that they can reflect on the concept of a 
good life – is an aspect of their practical self-consciousness.
33   
  The life of a rational creature is thus profoundly different from the life of a nonrational 
creature, but, if Aquinas is right, this difference does not disrupt the general connection 
between self-movement and goodness.  Rather, it transforms the kind of good that is in 
question, and makes an individual creature’s relationship to its own good correspondingly 
more complex.  For – taking the second point first – a rational creature’s self-movement is 
                                                 
33 If this seems a dark suggestion, compare it with Kant’s well-known claim that the imperative “ought” 
expresses “the relation of an objective law of reason to a will that is not necessarily determined by this law 
because of its subjective constitution” (Groundwork, Ak. IV:413).  Kant’s claim suggests a way of looking at the 
significance of normative language more generally: namely, as expressing the idea of a distinction, and the 
possibility of an accord, between how something is actually and how it is in the nature of that thing to be (a 
distinction, as Kant would put it, between how the thing is actually and the “law” that governs it).  To think of 
the objective laws of something’s constitution in this way is to think of them as specifying its good.  And if this 
is right, then a creature that can think about what it ought to do and what is good for it would be thinking in 
terms that presuppose a conception of its own constitution.  Such thinking expresses not just awareness of myself 
as an individual, but an at-least-implicit idea of what kind of thing I am: for when I think of how I ought to be, I 
am thinking in a way that must measure how I actually am against some general standard, a law I am under, or 
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mediated by thoughts about, and in the favorable case by knowledge of, its own good: its 
capacity for action is a capacity to pursue what it takes to be good.  And by the same token, 
the life of a rational creature will be one that essentially involves exercise of the power of 
reason, and will imply the existence of goods of a specifically rational kind (e.g., 
contemplation, friendship, justice).  The concept good to which a rational creature attains will 
be the concept of what is good in the life of that kind of rational creature, and this will not be 
merely determined by its “nature,” if this means something independent of its reason.  It 
would be a mistake to suppose that a rational creature is merely a creature that has a certain 
naturally-given inclinations and is capable of thinking about how to put that form into 
practice.  That is not the sort of nature a rational creature has: its nature is to live a specific 
sort of rational life, and its good will involve whatever features life by reason must involve.   
 
The rational apprehension of goodness.  To substantiate this standpoint on rational agency in 
detail would require another paper, but the basic points follow from the considerations of §4, 
together with the thought that a rational agent is one which determines how it acts by thinking 
about how to act.  For to say that a rational agent is one whose thinking about how to act 
determines how it acts is to say that it is an agent whose doing A depends on its capacity to 
reflect on the question “What shall I do?”, in such a way that its acceptance of the answer “A” 
can constitute its setting to do A.
34  At a minimum, this will involve the power to consider the 
relation of means to ends: a rational agent will be one who, if he is intentionally doing A, and 
if he recognizes that doing A* is means of doing A, can thereby come to do A* because he is 
doing A.  In short, a rational agent will be one whose thought can make true propositions of 
the form 
(8) S  is doing A* because S is doing A. 
This is the kind of proposition that was the focus of our discussion in §4, the kind on which 
our characterization of goal-directed movement hinged.  But observe that, when applied to 
                                                 
34 This is not to suggest that, whenever an agent intentionally does one thing with a view to doing another, this 
must be the product of prior deliberation about this course of action: the claim that intentional action must 
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even in the case of actions that are not the result of prior reflection, the relevance of the capacity for such 
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rational agents, propositions of form (8) take a special turn: they require for their truth that the 
subject should know the relevant explanation to be true.  A subject who does not know that he 
is doing A is not doing A intentionally, and a subject who does not know that he is doing A* 
because he is doing A is not doing A* with the intention of doing A.    
  Now, if a rational agent is one whose self-movement is subject to explanations which 
are essentially known to their subject, what follows about the way in which such an agent 
must think of his own actions and of what explains them?  Well, if we are right that, in 
general, truths of form (8) presuppose general truths about the kind to which the subject 
belongs, truths which carry implications about what is good for things of that kind, then a 
rational agent, in knowing what it is doing and why, will know truths with such 
presuppositions.
35  Moreover, his knowledge of such truths will not be merely an observer’s 
knowledge: his taking such facts to hold will, as we have seen, be essential to their holding.  
This implies that, on pain of regress, his grounds for believing that he is doing A* because he 
is doing A cannot be grounds for believing that this fact already obtains – for until he takes 
the relevant fact to obtain, it does not.  He must, if he is to be rational in making such a 
judgment, have another kind of ground: a ground for believing that, in accepting a certain 
justification for doing A*, he will be making it the case that he is doing A*.  But what kind of 
grounds could these be?  There is at least this constraint on them: they must be grounds that 
are potentially such as to warrant a judgment of the relevant kind; and we have argued that the 
relevant kind of judgment is one that presupposes facts about what is good for bearers of his 
sort of form.  But then, if the considerations of the preceding section are correct, it follows 
that a rational agent’s grounds for making a judgment of form (8) must be grounds that bear 
some relation to general sorts of aims belonging to creatures of the form that he bears.   
  This conclusion obviously needs further explanation, and we will elaborate on it in a 
moment; but first let us note how well it coheres with some familiar facts about how we know 
what we want and what we are doing.  We noted in §1 that a person who wants something can 
in general be asked why he wants it, and then he is expected to answer, not by describing how, 
as a matter of past history, his want arose, but rather by explaining what, here and now, 
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speaks in favor of pursuing the aim in question.  Similar points apply, mutatis mutandis, to an 
agent’s knowledge of why he is doing what he is doing: if S is doing A intentionally, then S is 
expected to be able to say why he is doing it by giving the reasons he takes to speak in favor 
of doing A.  Moreover, as G. E. M. Anscombe observed in a famous discussion of practical 
reasoning, explanations of this sort have a characteristic structure: where there is a substantive 
answer to the question “Why are you doing A?” (or “Why do you want to do A?”), a full 
statement of this answer terminates in some “desirability characterization” which represents 
what is sought as desirable or good in some intelligible respect (pleasant, appropriate, 
conducive to health, beneficial to a friend, required by fairness, satisfying of some intelligible 
life-ambition, …).
36  The agent may be wrong in supposing that the desired object would 
really be good in the relevant respect.  Indeed, an agent may do something although, in his 
considered judgment, it is not a good thing to do at all.  But even in this sort of case, if the 
agent has acted intentionally, we expect him to be able to explain what he did by saying what 
it was that seemed prima facie attractive about it, what form of good it at least appeared to 
promise.  And, as Anscombe remarks, “the good (perhaps falsely) conceived by the agent 
must really be one of the many forms of good” (1963, §40).   
  At least as a characterization of the presumptively normal case, these Anscombean 
descriptions seem evidently true: a rational agent is normally assumed to be in a position to 
explain his own doings and wantings-to-do, and the kind of explanation that is called for here 
is one that relates the doing in question to something that might intelligibly be taken to be 
some form of good.  But why should the primary explanation of what an agent wants or is 
doing be one that he can himself supply, and why should it take this particular shape?  Our 
account of the conditions under which a rational agent can know himself to be the subject of a 
fact of form  
(8) S  is doing A* because S is doing A 
suggests answers to these questions.  For we have observed, first, that a rational agent’s 
grounds for such a judgment must be grounds for believing that in so judging he is 
constituting the explanatory relation at issue; and we have argued, secondly, that his grounds 
for so judging must ultimately advert to the way in which the present goal-directed activity 
                                                 
36 Anscombe 1963, §37.  See also §§38-40 for further elaboration of the point. “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
  39 
 
serves some general sort of aim belonging to creatures of his form.  The first point speaks to 
the first question: he must be able to give the explanation because this is a sort of explanatory 
relation that holds only insofar as the subject takes it to hold.  The second point speaks to the 
second question: the explanation must terminate in a desirability characterization because 
what is articulated in such a characterization is precisely an account of the general aim that 
this case of goal-directed activity instances, and this is the sort of ground that any truth of 
form (8) must ultimately have. 
 
An excessively idealized picture?  The preceding paragraphs are an attempt to give some 
content to the Thomistic-Aristotelian idea of a hierarchy of different kinds of life, 
distinguished by different sorts of relation to form, but united by an abstract structure which 
connects the ascription of self-movement to individuals with the recognition of them as 
belonging to kinds that supply norms for their activities.  This picture of a “ladder of nature,” 
with nonrational animals occupying one rung and rational animals occupying another, higher 
rung, is often dismissed as reflecting a discredited worldview, one that is incompatible with 
Darwinian biology and with a more general commitment to naturalism.  It would be 
impossible for us to address this general misgiving here.  We can only ask the reader to 
consider whether our claims that the recognition of self-movement brings with it a certain 
kind of explanatory framework, and that the recognition of rational self-movement involves 
the application of a distinctive version of that framework, need stand in tension with a 
naturalistic understanding of the evolutionary background and material basis of vital 
processes.  Our own view is that, if the standpoint articulated here is in tension with anything, 
it is only with certain philosophically-contentious interpretations of what naturalism must 
involve. 
  Having tabled this broad misgiving, however, there is a more specific concern that we 
can address.  This is the concern that our account of rational agency is excessively idealized.  
This concern can take two forms.  First, our account of a rational creature’s relationship to its 
own good may seem to demand too much intellectual sophistication, more than actual human 
beings typically possess.  Secondly, even if it is granted that rational creatures must be 
capable of conceiving of their own good, the claim that intentional action in general reflects a 
subject’s taking what he is pursuing to be good may seem to imply a naïve or pious view of “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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what moves us to act.  We address these objections together because, although they take issue 
with different aspects of our conception of rational agency, we believe they are both rooted in 
a failure to grasp the logical character of the guise of the good thesis.  Answering the 
objections will give us an opportunity to clarify this character. 
  Consider first the charge that the account demands too much intellectual sophistication 
on the part of rational creatures.  Can’t children and unreflective adults possess the capacity to 
act for reasons even though they never have reflected on the general concept good?  Of course 
they can; but to focus on the question whether rational creatures in general must make explicit 
use of this concept is to miss our point.  To see this, compare this charge of intellectualism 
with a similar charge that might be brought against the claim that rational creatures must 
believe under the guise of the true.  Here too it is natural to object that only a quite 
sophisticated reasoner gives thought to the concept true.  But the point of saying that rational 
believers must believe under the guise of the true is not to insist that all their beliefs take the 
form “p is true,” but rather to point out something about the manner in which they must 
consider any belief of the form “p.”  A rational believer is one who can reflect on his grounds 
for holding any given belief, one who can put to himself the question whether p and why.  
“Truth” names, so to speak, the dimension in which answers to the question whether p add up: 
a consideration is relevant only if it speaks to whether p is true, and a creature that is not 
capable of distinguishing relevant from irrelevant answers to this question is not yet capable 
of reflecting on its grounds for belief.  Thus any rational creature must at least implicitly 
possess the idea of truth: its capacity for reflection involves a capacity to bring the standard of 
truth to bear, even if it has never reflected on this standard as such or mastered a term that 
designates it.  It may not have the predicate “is true” in its vocabulary, but the standard that 
this predicate designates provides the structure of its reflection.  Moreover, even an 
unreflective rational subject who believes a proposition accepts it as true in a plain enough 
sense: such a subject has the power to reflect on what he believes, and if on reflection he does 
not take the relevant proposition to be true, he will in so judging have changed his belief 
about it. 
  Similarly, the point of saying that rational agents must act under the guise of the good 
is not to insist that their practical reasoning must arrive at conclusions of the form “Doing A 
would be good,” but rather to point out something about the manner in which they must “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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consider the question whether to do A.  Just as a rational believer is one who can reflect on his 
grounds for belief by putting to himself the question “Why p?”, so a rational agent is one that 
can reflect on his grounds for action by putting to himself the question “What speaks in favor 
of doing A?”  Just as “truth” names the standard we apply in answering the former question, 
so “goodness” names the standard for answers to the latter: it specifies the topic on which a 
consideration must bear in order even to be a candidate answer to the question.  And although 
there may be rational creatures which have not reflected on this topic as such or learned a 
term that designates it, still any such creature must grasp this topic at least implicitly, for it 
must recognize what kind of answer the question “What speaks in favor of doing A?” calls for, 
on pain of not being a rational agent at all.  If this is right, then the intentional actions of a 
rational agent express his regarding those actions as good in a plain enough sense: for such an 
agent has the power to reflect on how to act, and if on reflection he does not accept that a 
given way of acting has at least something good about it, he will in so doing have changed his 
mind about whether to do it.       
  But isn’t this account of the motivation of intentional action too pious?  Don’t we 
sometimes intentionally do things that we judge to be wicked or worthless?  No doubt we do, 
but care must be taken in interpreting this fact.  It is sometimes suggested that the capacity for 
rational reflection effects a radical separation between an individual subject’s thinking about 
what to do and any general facts about what kind of creature that subject is and what is good 
for such creatures.
37  On this view, the power to reflect on the question “What should I do?” is 
the power precisely to transcend any allegiance to the goods of one’s kind – not, as we 
maintain, the power to relate to those goods in a way mediated by the capacity for self-
consciousness.  This conception of reason as the power to transcend any merely automatic 
allegiance to a certain list of goods does, of course, contain an important truth: namely, that a 
rational creature is one that can ask itself, with regard to any given putative good, “Why 
should I care about that?”  In acknowledging this truth, however, we should not forget how 
one goes about answering this sort of question.  Suppose the putative good in question is, say, 
justice to one’s fellow human beings, and suppose that some agent seeks to call the 
authenticity of this good into question: what sorts of considerations might figure in his 
                                                 
37 For this sort of view, see for instance John McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism” (1995). “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
  42 
 
critique?  Well, he might, for instance, condemn justice as Thrasymachus and Callicles do, by 
arguing that the life of a just person is cowardly and slavish.  But notice that in doing so he 
would be condemning one putative good by appealing to others – in this instance, the goods 
of a courageous and free existence.  And surely some such appeal would occur in any 
intelligible answer to this sort of question.  A rational subject can call the value of any given 
good into question, but such questioning must, if it is to be intelligible as reasoning at all, 
appeal to other goods whose value is not in question. 
  Even an agent who does something he takes to be wicked or worthless can normally 
say why he did it, at least in the sense that he can say what feature of the action was prima 
facie appealing to him.  Moreover, the action’s at least seeming attractive to him in the 
relevant respect is precisely what explains his performing it, in spite of his reservations.  If 
this is right, then such examples do not show the guise of the good thesis to be false.  Indeed, 
they rather tend to confirm it.  For, as Aquinas notes in the passage quoted at the beginning of 
this section, the presence of reason in us is exactly what makes room for willings that do not 
tend toward things that are good “in very truth”: once we are equipped with the thought that 
rational action involves an exercise of the power to judge things good, we are in a position to 
recognize that there can be appetites which the subject does not judge or believe to be good at 
all.  Such appetites would be akin to perceptual appearances: they would be appearings-good, 
just as perceptual appearances are appearings-true.  They would present themselves as prima 
facie grounds for choice, just as perceptual appearances present themselves as prima facie 
grounds for judgment.  But just as a subject can disbelieve the testimony of his senses even as 
the appearances persist (e.g., I can disbelieve that the stick in the water-glass is really bent 
although it continues to look bent), so a subject can disapprove of the urgings of his appetites 
even as these urgings persist (e.g., I can think that lust is encouraging me to do something 
bad, although the impulse to do it remains as strong as ever).  The objects of such appetites 
are not believed good, but the appetites themselves continue to represent those objects as good 
in a perfectly intelligible sense: they present their objects as having features that make them 
prima facie desirable, even if we doubt that something with those features would really be 
desirable.
38 
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  We thus arrive at the traditional view that when a person intentionally does something 
he judges to be wicked or worthless, this reflects a kind of mutiny of some of his motivational 
faculties, a mutiny that involves the action’s being put forward as desirable by appetite or 
passion, even as reason denies its desirability.  This sort of mutiny is certainly possible, but 
what is not possible is that it be the normal case.  For a subject possess the power of practical 
reason only if his reflection on what to do is in general determinative of what he actually does 
do, and we have seen that a rational subject’s reflection on what to do must be at least 
implicitly sensitive to his judgments about what would be good to do.  Hence a rational agent 
must in general judge his actions to have something genuinely good about them; and even in 
the cases where he does not, this will be because he is subject to an appearance of goodness 
which engages his power to act in conscious pursuit of ends, even as it overpowers his 
judgment about what is really good. 
 
Conclusion.  The thesis we have been defending is abstract.  This bears emphasizing because 
it brings out how many questions of substantive moral philosophy are left open by our 
conclusions.  We have concluded that a rational agent must act under the guise of the good in 
the sense that he must in general pursue ends in virtue of taking there to be something good 
about those ends.  We have granted that his recognition of this standard of goodness may be 
merely implicit, and we have said about the relevant standard only that it must reflect more 
general facts about the kind to which the agent belongs.  We have not said anything about the 
content of this standard, not even whether the propositions that characterize it depend merely 
on abstract facts about what it is to be a rational being (this would be a kind of Kantian view), 
or on more determinate facts about what it is to be a human rational being (this, we believe, 
would be closer to Aristotle’s view).  In any event, to investigate the content of our concept 
good would require a different kind of reflection from the one in which we have been 
engaged: we have merely been investigating the form of this concept, and the kind of role it 
must play in our practical thought.  But this investigation suffices to answer philosophers who 
would deny that this concept has any role to play in our wanting and willing. 
  Our project in this paper has been to make a case for the Aristotelian doctrine that 
rational agents must desire under the guise of the good; but we hope that even readers who are 
                                                                                                                                                       
the Good (2007).   “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
  44 
 
not convinced by this case will now possess a clearer view of the context into which the guise 
of the good thesis fits.  Most contemporary opponents of the thesis discuss it in isolation from 
broader issues about teleological explanation and the relation between an individual creature 
and its kind.  Our aims have been, first, to show how the thesis fits into this larger framework, 
and secondly, to suggest that the framework itself is not just some antiquated worldview that 
we can brush aside, but a perceptive analysis of forms of thought that are essential to our 
everyday understanding of ourselves.  If the thesis turns out to articulate a commitment 
involved in the application of these forms of thought, then it cannot be lightly dismissed, for 
we can no more brush aside these forms than we can brush aside our capacity for choice itself. “Goodness and Desire,” M. Boyle and D. Lavin    10/15/09 
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